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chapter 7
reflections: On Judicial diversity and Judicial 
independence
Sonia Lawrence*
i am silver and exact. i have no preconceptions.1
This contribution is an effort to conceptualize the ways in which we 
might understand the role that diversity on the bench plays in the in-
dependence of the judiciary. could a judiciary homogenous in terms of 
race and gender also be an independent judiciary?2 in this paper, i ex-
plore the relationship between diversity and judicial independence and 
suggest that judicial independence may require a bench which “reason-
ably reflects the diversity of the society which it serves.”3
* With thanks to the editors of this volume for suggesting the topic and for helpful pre-
liminary discussions, encouragement and editorial comments. i am grateful for the excel-
lent, thoughtful research and editorial assistance of arati dubey (Osgoode llB 2009). 
Special thanks to dr. Mary Stratton of the Forum on civil Justice for a helpful conversa-
tion about primary research into public perceptions. all errors are entirely my own.
1 Sylvia plath, “Mirror” in The Collected poems, Ted hughes, ed. (new York: Bucaneer 
Books, 1981) at 173.
2 The term “race” here is understood to have a social as opposed to a biological meaning. 
The lack of scientific foundation to a biological classification system notwithstanding, 
the social significance of racialization in the unequal distribution of goods cannot be 
ignored. Trying to be colour-blind is as problematic as reifying the concept. My use of 
the term is intended to capture its social significance without accepting any biological 
meaning or implying any support for the way that “race” is used in social processes.
3 The phrase is from standard advertisements of judicial vacancies at the Ontario court 
of Justice. See Ontario Judicial appointments advisory committee, Annual Report for 
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in the canadian context, judicial independence—the “cornerstone 
of democracy”—is described as dependent on a wide variety of condi-
tions, including judicial remuneration, court budgets, the discipline of 
judges, politics, and the appointments process, but these do not usually 
include a diverse judiciary.4 There is also significant, but almost com-
pletely separate, canadian literature about diversity on the bench.5 Why 
the period January 1, 2005 to 31 December 2005 (Toronto: Ontario Judicial appointments 
advisory committee, January 2006). Judicial independence is not the only value which 
speaks to the importance of an independent judiciary. For instance, we could turn to 
anti-discrimination principles: see dame Brenda hale, “equality and the Judiciary: 
Why Should We Want More Women Judges?” (2001) p.l. 489 (discussion of equal op-
portunity) [hale]; department for constitutional affairs, “independent Scrutiny of the 
appointment processes of Judges and Queen’s counsel” by Sir leonard peach (london: 
hMSO, 1999), online: department for constitutional affairs www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/
peach/indexfr.htm; Sally J. Kenney, “equal employment Opportunity and representa-
tion: extending the Frame to courts” (2004) 11 Social politics 86.
4 in canada, judicial independence is protected under s. 11(d) of the Charter and ss. 96–
100 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (uK), 30 & 31 vict., c. 3, reprinted in r.S.c. 1985, app. 
ii, no. 5. Judicial independence is a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the 
Charter, and it is an unwritten constitutional principle. For example, see carl Baar, “Ju-
dicial independence and Judicial administration: The case of provincial court Judges” 
(1998) 9:4 constitutional Forum 114; Michael J. Bryant, “Judging the Judges: Judicial 
independence and reforms to the Supreme court of canada appointment process” 
(2004) 24 Sup. ct. l. rev. 29; Martin Friedland, “Judicial independence and account-
ability in canada” (2001) 59 The advocate 859; ian Greene, “The doctrine of Judicial 
independence developed by the Supreme court of canada” (1988) 26 Osgoode hall l.J. 
177; William r. lederman, “independence of the Judiciary” (1956) 34 can. Bar rev. 1139; 
Wayne renke, “The independence and impartiality of provincial court Judges” (1998) 9 
constitutional Forum 121; Gerald T.G. Seniuk, “Judicial independence and the Supreme 
court of canada” (1998) 77 can. Bar rev. 381; “First World conference on the independ-
ence of Justice: universal declaration on the independence of Justice” (adopted By 
The First World conference On The independence Of Justice, Montreal, June 1983) in 
Shimon Shetreet & Jules deschênes, eds., Judicial independence: The Contemporary De-
bate (dordrecht: Martinus nijhoff publishers, 1985). peter russell & david O’Brien, eds., 
Judicial independence in the Age of Democracy: Critical perspectives from Around the World 
(charlottesville: university press of virginia, 2001) [russell & O’Brien]. critiques of 
judicial appointments processes in other jurisdictions have more clearly developed the 
link between judicial independence and the identity of judges. See especially du Bois, 
“Judicial Selections in post-apartheid South africa” [du Bois] in peter russell & Kate 
Malleson, eds., Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial power: Critical perspectives from 
Around the World (Toronto: university of Toronto press, 2006) [russell & Malleson].
5 almost all of this literature is about gender; see for instance, national association of 
Women and the law, Creating Diversity on the Bench: Submissions to the Department 
of Justice on Revising the federal Judicial Appointments process (Ottawa: naWl, 1993); 
regina Graycar, “The Gender of Judgments: Some reflections on Bias” (1998) 32 u.B.c. 
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the separation? part of the reason is that judicial independence (like 
any concept worth its salt) is not particularly well defined. attempts 
at definition are often cabined by jurisdiction or limited to the world 
of theory. Furthermore, judicial independence is not a “goal in itself,” 
but rather a means to impartiality and legitimacy, so that links between 
diversity and legitimacy and impartiality might not explicitly mention 
judicial independence despite a clear connection.6 another possible 
reason for the paucity of direct considerations of the topic may be the 
sense that we believe we have established institutional-level judicial 
independence in this country. Thus even the government is prepared 
to accept that the bench ought to be diverse, and many will recognize 
the problem of a bench that lacks diversity—but we cannot recognize 
it as a judicial independence problem.7 Most of the commentary about 
judicial independence consists of the argument that a given change or 
group of changes (usually changes initiated by government) is harm-
ing judicial independence.8 linking diversity on the bench to judicial 
l. rev. 1; Madam Justice c. l’heureux-dubé, “Making a difference: The pursuit of a 
compassionate Justice” (1997) 31 u.B.c. l. rev. 1 at 7. Some of this literature takes an 
empirical approach. See James Stribopoulos & Moin a. Yahya, “does a Judge’s party of 
appointment or Gender Matter to case Outcomes?: an empirical Study of the court 
of appeal for Ontario” (2007) 45 Osgoode hall l.J. 315 [Stribipoulos & Yahya]; peter 
Mccormick & Twyla Job, “do Women Judges Make a difference—an analysis by 
appeal court data” (1993) 8 can. J.l. & Soc. 135 (but see critique in Joan a. Brockman, 
“difference without a distinction” (1993) 8 can. J.l. & Soc. 149).
6 american scholar John Ferejohn, in “independent Judges, dependent Judiciary: 
explaining Judicial independence” (1999) 72 S. cal. l. rev. 353, argues that judicial 
independence has no value in and of itself, but is only a means to other ends: “insti-
tutional judicial independence is, however, a complex value in that it really cannot 
be seen as something valuable in itself. rather, it is instrumental to the pursuit of 
other values, such as the rule of law or constitutional values.”; peter russell describes 
impartiality as a “sister concept” to judicial independence (“Towards a General Theory 
of Judicial independence” in russell & O’Brien, above note 4 at 2).
7 Government statements, politically expedient as they may be, indicate that reflecting 
society and diversity are goals in judicial appointment. For the goal statements of the 
Ontario Judicial appointments committee and the Office of the commissioner for 
Federal Judicial affairs, see below notes 56 and 68.
8 although few would define judicial independence as threatened only by the activities 
of governments, the majority of commentary and judicial consideration in canada is 
focused on this aspect. One counter example is patricia hughes, “Judicial independ-
ence: contemporary pressures and appropriate responses” (2001) 80 can. Bar rev. 
181 (considers the possible impact on judicial independence of harsh public critique 
of feminist judges or decisions with feminist underpinnings). There is more extensive 
american writings on threats to judicial independence from organized non-state ac-
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independence, on the other hand, would suggest that we have not truly 
had judicial independence in the past, since historically it has been un-
deniably a homogenous bench—at least in terms of race, ethnicity, and 
gender. The context of many judicial independence controversies means 
that arguments for judicial independence are often—read simply—
arguments against interference with existing practice.9 demand for a 
diverse bench, in contrast, usually consists of requests for a break with 
past practice. establishing the link between judicial independence and 
diversity on the bench brings in new questions and opens new areas for 
research and policy-making.
in part i of this paper i begin to sketch an answer to the question, 
“can a homogenous bench be an independent bench?” by focusing on 
democratic legitimacy, public confidence, and the idea of structural im-
partiality. in part ii, i suggest that “diversity” cannot cure the problems 
that have been identified, and that legitimacy and public confidence re-
quire some attention to the courts as representative institutions. i then 
attempt to sort through the complications arising from this suggestion, 
and defend the notion of a representative bench from some of the main 
critiques. part iii briefly describes two systems of judicial appointment 
in canada, and the different approaches they take to the question of 
diversity and representation. Finally, i conclude by describing basic re-
search questions which arise from this exploration, and accepting the 
limitations of calls for a “reflective” bench.
A. CAN A hOMOGENOUS BENCh BE AN INDEPENDENT 
BENCh?
peter russell writes: “The study of judicial independence cannot pos-
sibly cover all of the connections between the judiciary and the world 
in which it is embedded.”10 One of the important connections that rus-
tors. See for instance, richard delgado, “rodrigo’s committee assignment: a Sceptical 
look at Judicial independence” (1999) 72 S. cal. l. rev. 425.
 9 a third argument, at its most cynical, suggests that debate over judicial independ-
ence is a device which distracts critical attention away from the (sometimes unjust or 
discriminatory) substance of judicial decisions. See delgado, above note 8 at 438.
10 russell, in russell & O’Brien, above note 6 at 4 (russell goes on to ask “What are the 
relationships that are thought to have the greatest bearing on judicial independence in 
terms of enhancing or threatening judicial independence?”).
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sell asks about is the connection between the identity characteristics of 
judges and the status hierarchies apparent in the larger social structure. 
Where the identity characteristics of the judges are those of the power-
ful in other sectors of social, political, and economic life—as opposed 
to mirroring the population being judged—has judicial independence 
really been established? i offer two suggestions about how independ-
ence is affected by such conditions. First, the judiciary has strong social 
and identity connections to already powerful identity groups in an un-
equal society. This sets the judiciary up as a symbol of social exclusion 
that may harm the democratic legitimacy of the institution (particularly 
in the perception of excluded groups). Second, the judiciary as a group 
is largely homogenous, and the institution and its individual members 
are largely able to pursue their work without facing “the challenge of 
difference” from peers and colleagues (although they may well face it 
daily on the other side of the bench).
These two suggestions rely on a particular vision of impartiality (the 
sister concept of judicial independence), a critical and realist approach 
which accepts that individual experiences have shaped and formed 
each person, and they condition the way that we see and understand 
things. in a society deeply marked by inequality, our experiences are 
closely linked to our ascriptive identities. however, we also recognize 
judicial independence as a characteristic that manifests at both the in-
dividual and the group level, moving us beyond a consideration of indi-
vidual ascriptive characteristics and towards an exploration of the way 
that these characteristics in aggregate can affect the independence of 
the group or institution.
My first suggestion indicates that we cannot ignore the connection 
between the judiciary and the other hierarchies which mark our soci-
ety without allowing the judiciary to be a(nother) symbol of hierarchy 
through difference, another marker of where power resides in terms of 
colour, ethnicity, and gender. arguably, some harm to judicial independ-
ence is done through the connection of the judiciary with the powerful 
members in society through a variety of forms of privilege differential-
ly distributed through (for the purposes of this discussion) ascriptive 
identity characteristics. i do not mean to equate this social connection 
with insecure tenure or insufficient remuneration, issues which might 
lead to doctrinal or constitutional arguments about a lack of judicial 
independence. For one thing, these bonds of social connection are not 
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easily manipulated like tenure and remuneration. instead, my point is 
that dominant understandings of judicial independence may ignore 
simple truths about unequal societies. in some ways, the bench is just 
another symbol of persistent exclusion, and as such it may fail to attract 
the confidence of the public, particularly those sections of the public 
that are unrepresented.11 if the consequences of a homogenous bench 
could include a loss of faith in the ability of the courts to deliver fair and 
impartial justice, this creates a clear and important role for diversity on 
the bench in establishing and maintaining judicial independence.
in part, the issues i have raised of exclusion, public confidence, and 
legitimacy are empirical questions and unfortunately there is a dearth 
of solid and relevant data. This is not simply because of a lack of strong 
data sets, but also because the data that does exist suggests that many 
of us are “deeply confused,” demanding that judges adhere to tradition 
and at the same time believing that judges are “old and out of touch.”12 
Questions about how judicial diversity might affect public confidence, 
and in particular the confidence of minority populations, are compli-
cated by the possibility that for many, the classical image (white, male, 
older, able bodied) of the judge is comforting and inspires confidence 
precisely because of the deep roots of the privilege accorded this group. 
if, as the public, we have confidence in a group of judges because we 
have internalized a set of prejudicial, racist, and sexist attitudes, ought 
we to be allowed to use this to defend an unrepresentative judiciary?
although some authors have concluded that judges do not under-
stand the public that they serve, the question of whether or not the 
public—or which publics—connect this lack of understanding with the 
identity of individual judges, the diversity on the bench, or the repre-
sentativeness of the judiciary is not answered by the available data.13 
The canadian Forum on civil Justice has concluded that “[s]uch [large 
11 Sherrilyn a. ifill, “Judging the Judges: racial diversity, impartiality, and representation 
on State Trial courts” (1997) 39 B.c. l. rev. 95 at 98 (the persistent exclusion point). 
The homogeneity of the bench is obviously linked with, although not completely 
explained by, the homogeneity of the bar.
12 hale, above note 3 at 501–2 (concern with people associating authority, neutrality, and 
seriousness with older middle class men).
13 See for instance, donna J. Martinson, “Some Thoughts on public perceptions of the 
role of Judges in the administration of Justice in canada” in Jean Maurice Brisson & 
donna Greschner, eds., public perceptions of the Administration of Justice (Montreal: les 
editions Themis, 1995).
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scale] results as are available are mixed, but usually more positive than 
negative,” but perhaps more importantly, “. . . there is surprisingly little 
reliable empirical evidence about public perceptions of the justice sys-
tem—we know less than we thought we did and there is a lot that we 
do not know.”14
There are some uS and uK studies which suggest that distrust of 
the court system (generally, as opposed to specific positions within that 
system, such as judges) is higher among some minority communities, 
and that a lack of diversity within the system enhances this distrust.15 
One uK study found that significant numbers of minorities said that 
increased numbers of ethnic minority personnel (not limited to judges, 
however) would enhance legitimacy of, authority of, and confidence in, 
the courts.16 however, experts in both the uK and canada describe a 
serious need for more and better empirical research into this particular 
question.17 We could also, of course, approach the question of demo-
cratic legitimacy normatively instead of or in addition to empirically and 
14 Mary Stratton, “public perceptions of the role of the canadian Judiciary” The Canadian 
forum on Civil Justice (december 2005), online: cFcJ cfcj-fcjc.org/docs/2005/cjsp-
perceptions-en.pdf.
15 Both studies can be found at the national center for State courts website: david B. 
rottman et al., “perceptions of the courts in Your community: The influence of experi-
ence, race and ethnicity. national center for State courts” (January 2003), online: ncSc 
www.ncsconline.org/Wc/publications/res_amtpTc_perceptionspub.pdf; Frank a. Ben-
nack, “how the public views the State courts: a 1999 national Survey” (14 May 1999), 
online: ncSc www.ncsconline.org/Wc/publications/res_amtpTc_publicviewcrtspub.
pdf.
16 Shute et al., A fair Hearing? ethnic Minorities in the Criminal Courts (portland: Willan 
publishing, 2005) at 115. See also Julie vennard et al., “ethnic Minority Magistrates’ 
experience of the role and of the court environment” (2004), online: department for 
constitutional affairs (uK) www.dca.gov.uk/research/2004/3_2004.htm at 50 and 115. 
The vennard et al. study looked at magistrates, appointed as lay people. it found some 
evidence that ethnic minority magistrates felt that more ethnic minority appointments 
would improve the confidence of minority communities in the Magistrates courts.
17 personal communication with dr. Mary Stratton, research director at the cFcJ (31 
July 2008). See also cheryl Thomas, Judicial Diversity in the united Kingdom and other 
Jurisdictions: A Review of Research, policies and practices (london: commission for 
Judicial appointments, 2005) at 108 (“a more comprehensive study of whether ethnic 
minorities and whites view the courts (and judicial diversity) differently in terms of the 
fairness of courts and confidence in the judiciary, and what impact recent direct court 
experience has on these different groups’ opinions . . . would more directly address 
the issue of whether the current make-up of the judiciary meets the justice needs of a 
multicultural Britain.”).
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argue that “it is wrong in principle for [such] authority to be wielded by 
such a very unrepresentative section of the population.”18 developing 
the empirical side of this argument, however, may provide substantial 
persuasive power in public policy debate. it would also encourage atten-
tion to public opinion as a critically important and under-researched 
aspect of judicial independence.
My second suggestion about why a homogenous bench cannot be 
judicially independent looks at the judicial community as a significant 
part of the context informing each individual member’s decision making: 
“impartiality is not some stance above the fray, but the characteristic of 
judgments made by taking into account the perspectives of others in 
the judging community.”19 Taking the phrase “judging community” quite 
literally, a judiciary that is homogenous arguably lacks what american 
scholar Sherrilyn ifill calls “structural impartiality”:
Structural impartiality is realized through the interaction of diverse 
viewpoints on the bench and the resulting decreased opportunity for 
one perspective to consistently dominate judicial decision-making.20
Jennifer nedelsky draws a connection between familiarity with diverse 
viewpoints and the exercise of judgment:
. . . if the faculties and student bodies of law schools, the practicing bar 
as well as the judiciary actually reflected the full diversity of society, 
then every judge would have had long experience in exercising judg-
ment, through the process of trying to persuade (in imagination and 
actual dialogue) people from a variety of backgrounds and perspec-
tives. This would better prepare judges for judging situations about 
which they had no first- or even second-hand knowledge. it would 
vastly decrease the current likelihood of a single set of very limited 
perspectives determining the judgment.21
18 hale, above note 3 at 502.
19 Jennifer nedelsky, “embodied diversity and the challenges to law” (1997) 42 McGill l.J. 
91 at 107. See also The hon. Maryka Omatsu, “The Fiction of Judicial impartiality” (1997) 
9 c.J.W.l. 1 at 7 (arguing that the presence of members of under-represented groups on 
the bench compensates for a lack of experience which can create “systemic” blind spots).
20 Sherrilyn a. ifill, “Judging the Judges: racial diversity, impartiality, and representation 
on State Trial courts” (1997) 39 B.c. l. rev. 95 at 119.
21 nedelsky, above note 19 at 107–8.
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nedelsky suggests that imagination can play a role, whereas ifill’s 
structural impartiality is a concept she has argued for in litigation and 
requires the interaction to be between real people. But both are recog-
nizing that when there is a “difference” in a room, it is the whole room 
which, in some ways, becomes different than it was before. To the extent 
that judge’s dining rooms, libraries, training sessions, and the like are 
homogenous, they do not offer as many opportunities for facing different 
perspectives as they could.22 as a group, the range of beliefs, experi-
ences, and attitudes is narrower than that found in society as a whole. 
The significance of diversity is heightened (and the empirical evidence 
is even more clear) when we look at appellate courts sitting as panels, 
where judges must deliberate and craft decisions as a group.23 This con-
cept is fundamental to understanding the role that diversity plays in 
furthering judicial independence. empirical evidence supports the view 
that diversity on judicial panels changes the dynamic in ways which 
give rise to changed decisions. To the extent that this suggests that ap-
pointing and elevating judges in ways which create homogenous courts 
is a method of manipulating decisions, it also suggests that democratic 
legitimacy is potentially harmed if judges are not appointed and elevated 
in ways which reflect the society being judged.
B. BEYOND DIvERSITY: ThE REFLECTIvE JUDICIARY
having suggested some problems arising out of a homogenous judiciary, 
i now turn to the question of what would rectify these problems. The 
original brief of this article was to comment on diversity and judicial 
22 See Jeremy Webber, “The adjudication of contested Social values: implications of at-
titudinal Bias for the appointment of Judges” in Ontario law reform commission, Ap-
pointing Judges: philosophy, politics and practice (Toronto: Olrc, 1991) at 27 (“. . . broad 
representation within the court system . . . is valuable first as a way of confronting 
judges with the fact of normative diversity. When different perspectives are repre-
sented among their colleagues, judges are less likely to fall into an easy consensus, a 
consensus which may not reach much beyond the courthouse, large downtown firms 
and those firms’ clients . . . . [W]e must have more of the diversity of our society repre-
sented on the bench, so that the inescapable residue of attitudinal bias in adjudication 
reflects something of the range of attitudes present in our society.”).
23 See for instance, Stribopoulos & Yahya, above note 5. Outside the canadian context and 
more generally on this topic, see harry T. edwards, “The effects of collegiality on Judicial 
decision Making” (2003) 151 u. pa. l. rev. 1639; lewis a. Kornhauser & lawrence G. 
Sager, “The One and the Many: adjudication in collegial courts” (1993) 81 cal. l. rev. 1.
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independence, but now i am not sure that diversity is the right term at 
all. i suspect that one of the ways that questions about diversity on the 
bench get separated from questions of judicial independence through 
the use of the term “diversity” itself. in exploring what the term itself 
means, i consider the kinds of diversity relevant to this discussion and 
suggest that the term diversity be replaced by the notion of reflection, 
or representativeness.
diversity itself could have many meanings in the context of the judi-
ciary: diversity of political opinion; diversity of routes to the bench; di-
versity of practice specialties prior to elevation. in this paper, the basic 
question (can a homogenous bench be an independent bench?) relies 
only on an absence of diversity. But what is the opposite? i propose 
that diversity is too vague, and suggest instead the notion of a judiciary 
which represents or reflects the community it serves.
Whether we use the term diverse, representative, or reflective, we 
have to answer basic questions about which aspects of identity we are 
interested in. if we seek to change the composition of the bench be-
cause of concerns about inequality and power compromising judicial 
independence, then it should be those aspects of identity most relevant 
to inequality and power which interest us. relying on an anti-oppression 
or anti-subordination framework, we can assert that questions of differ-
ence and diversity are important because of the ways that the power 
to subordinate and oppress classes of people operates and is reinforced 
through the marking of difference. The enormous power of the law makes 
the judiciary particularly critical, and as peter russell has written, the 
public is increasingly demanding this “unmasking the power of judicial 
elite to recreate itself and the social exclusiveness of that elite.”24
We should, then, concentrate on those differences which serve 
society, or “significant social divisions” in society at large. This paper 
does not purport to outline which differences matter—especially since 
my argument acknowledges that these will differ amongst jurisdictions 
and through time—but it does seem that some measures of difference 
24 here i refer both to the choice of judges and to the activities of judges. See errol 
Mendes, “promoting heterogeneity of the Judicial Mind: Minority and Gender rep-
resentation in the canadian Judiciary” in Ontario law reform commission, Appointing 
Judges: philosophy, politics and practice (Toronto: Olrc, 1991) at 94: “. . . the canadian 
legal system reinforces an unrepresentative and assimilating ‘power paradigm.’” peter 
russell, “conclusion” in russell & Malleson, above note 4 at 422.
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amongst the judiciary, such as practice specialties prior to elevation, do 
not mark significant social divisions in society at large (although there 
is the important possibility that they are an indirect marker, a vehicle 
for systemic forms of discrimination).25 in seeking out those differences 
which mark major social divisions i could look to a variety of sources—
recent political controversy, recent legal controversy, media reports, and 
public opinion polls. We should not underestimate the significance of 
the choice of “relevant” difference, since these choices participate in 
the creation and recognition of the categories we claim to merely recog-
nize.26 For instance, none of the characteristics central to this paper fea-
ture in the Supreme Court Act—but that act does require that three of 
the judges appointed be from the province of Quebec.27 There is also a 
long-term custom of appointing the other judges in a way which creates 
regional diversity in the court, all of which constitutes recognition of 
the significance of regional divisions in canada. dubois points out that 
in South africa, at least, there is reason to be concerned that “dimen-
sions of diversity that may be less central to social conflict (e.g., sexual 
orientation and physical handicaps) fall by the wayside.”28 in this light, 
we might also think about the broad support garnered by (ultimately 
unsuccessful) calls for an aboriginal judge to sit on the Supreme court 
of canada as indicative of the ongoing centrality of the settler/First 
25 The department for constitutional affairs in england collects information on type of 
practice as part of its efforts to ensure a more representative judiciary. See below note 
48. Similarly, this paper does not look directly at ideological commitments, political 
party affiliations, or donations, a complicated and controversial area of study. See, for 
instance, Matthew hennigar, Troy riddell, & lori hausegger “Judicial Selection in 
canada: a look at patronage in Federal appointments since 1988” (2008) 58 u.T.l.J. 39 
(using evidence of donations to political parties to suggest that patronage plays a role 
in federal judicial appointments); craig Forcese & aaron Freeman, The Laws of Govern-
ment: The Legal foundations of Canadian Government (Toronto: irwin law, 2005); Kirk 
Makin, “appointment of Judges too political critics Say” Globe and Mail (16 May 2005); 
peter h. russell & Jacob S. Ziegel, “Federal Judicial appointments: an appraisal of the 
First Mulroney Government’s appointments and the new Judicial advisory commit-
tees” (1991) 41 u.T.l.J. 37. See also russell, in russell & O’Brien, above note 6 at 17: “The 
greatest danger to judicial independence from political manipulation of the staffing or 
promotion process is ideological conformity.”
26 du Bois, above note 4 at 282; see also russell, “conclusion,” in russell & Malleson, 
above note 4 at 432.
27 Supreme Court Act, r.S.c. 1985, c. S-26, s.6.
28 du Bois, above note 4 at 282.
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nations conflict in this country.29 South africa’s constitution requires 
that judicial officers “reflect broadly the racial and gender composition 
of South africa” but it is perhaps worth noting that, centrality to so-
cial conflict aside, it is the relatively larger vulnerable groups (women, 
racialized people) who have achieved constitutional mention in South 
africa.30 The canadian statistics squarely raise the question of prioritiz-
ation in mechanisms for ending the domination of the bench by a single 
group, since they show a remarkable improvement in the appointment 
of women, but significantly less progress in appointing visible minor-
ities, First nations people, and the disabled.
There are, of course, complications involved in trying to discuss the 
composition of the judiciary from an anti-oppression standpoint. First, 
current appointments requirements ensure that the judiciary cannot re-
flect the population. in canada, the group of people eligible to become 
judges consists entirely of lawyers. Since socio-economic status combines 
measures of education, occupation, and income, lawyers will tend to sit 
at the higher reaches of any scale.31 in other words, there are built-in lim-
29 national organizations and prominent scholars supported this call. See for instance, 
richard Blackwell, “lawyers call for native on Top court” Globe and Mail (3 October 
2005); see also the canadian Bar association’s resolution 05-01-a: “recognition of 
legal pluralism in Judicial appointments” (passed august 2005), online: cBa www.
cba.org/cba/resolutions/pdf/05-01-a.pdf; canadian association of law Teachers, panel 
on Supreme Court Appointments Report (June 2005) (concluding, inter alia, that “The 
Supreme court should have at least one justice who is an aboriginal person and the 
independent commission should have aboriginal representation. The Supreme court 
should be composed of no fewer than four women.” Online: www.acpd-calt.org/english/
docs/Supremecourt_panel.pdf.).
30 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s. 174(2) (“The need for the judiciary 
to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South africa must be con-
sidered when judicial officers are appointed . . . .”).
31 But see hale, above note 3 at 503: “. . . by definition judges will be middle class when 
appointed but that does not mean that they should be middle class when they are 
born.” a few sample statistics will indicate the high earnings of lawyers and judges. 
recent canadian statistics (based on the 2004 tax year) show that those earning over 
$89,000 per year are in the top 5 percent of tax filers: “high-income canadians” (Sep-
tember 2007) 8(9) perspectives on labour and income. Online, Statistics canada www.
statcan.ca/english/freepub/75-001-Xie/2007109/articles/10350high-en.htm. in 1995, 
when the average income of all earners was $30,600, the average income of lawyers 
was $75,200. lawyers earned 146 times the average: Statistics canada, “earnings of 
lawyers Spring 2000 perspectives” by abdul rashid 18 catalogue 75-001 Xpe. Judicial 
salaries in canada are set by statute. Bill c-17, granted royal assent in december 2006, 
raised judicial salaries so that the chief Justice of the Supreme court made $298,500 
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itations or occupational qualifications which ensure that, for instance, no 
one with limited education could ever become a judge. likewise, judicial 
salaries all but ensure the financial security and socio-economic status of 
sitting judges. Given the significance of the judiciary as a part of society 
and a branch of government, these inherent limits are significant.
Since education requirements alone ensure that the judiciary can 
never be a perfect cross-section of society, the gate keeping functions 
performed by universities and law schools become inextricably inter-
twined with the appointments process and its outcomes. Opponents of 
changes in appointment methods to create a representative bench as-
sert that we can simply wait for a “trickle up” effect—as more women 
and minorities graduate from law schools and practice law, they will gain 
the seniority necessary for a successful application to become judges.32 
Yet the data are at least equivocal on this point. in canada, for instance, 
there are clear indications that women in the legal profession are fol-
lowing markedly different career paths than men, paths which are usu-
ally both less lucrative and less prestigious in the eyes of the broader 
profession.33 likewise, the empirical research in the uK shows similar 
differences between the career paths of minorities and whites entering 
the legal profession.34 These differences are precisely those which affect 
and the other judges of that court $276,400 each. Judges of the Ontario Superior 
court of Justice received $232,300: Judges Act, r.S.c. 1985, c. J-1, ss. 9 and 12(d).
32 This indicates the critical role of early educational equality of opportunity in terms 
of creating a representative pool of potential judges. See Keith d. ewing, “a Theory of 
democratic adjudication: Towards a representative, accountable and independent 
Judiciary” (2000) 38 alta. l. rev. 708 at 721 (suggesting a career judiciary as an appro-
priate solution to the lack of representativeness on the bench in the uK).
33 in the canadian context, see: Jean Mackenzie leiper, “it Was like ‘Wow!’: The experi-
ence of Women lawyers in a profession Marked by linear careers” (1997) 9 c.J.W.l. 
115; david Stager & david Foot, “lawyers earnings under Market Growth and differ-
entiation 1970–80” (1989) 22 canadian Journal of economics 151; Fiona M. Kay, “Flight 
from law: a competing risks Model of departures from law Firms” (1997) 31 law & 
Soc’y rev. 301; John hagan & Fiona M. Kay, Gender in practice: A Study of Lawyers Lives 
(Oxford: Oxford university press, 1995); Jean Mackenzie leiper, Bar Codes: Women 
in the Legal profession (vancouver: uBc press, 2006); Kathleen e. hull & robert l. 
nelson, “assimilation, choice, or constraint? Testing Theories of Gender differences 
in the careers of lawyers” (2000) 79 Social Forces 229; lianne Krakauer & charles p. 
chen, “Gender Barriers in the legal profession: implications for career development of 
Female law Students” (2003) 40 Journal of employment counseling 65.
34 See hale, above note 3 at 492 (referring to the situation in the uK for “women, mem-
bers of ethnic and religious minorities, gays, and other non-standard issue” she wrote 
that “[m]ost serious outside observers know that it is not so simple”).
Judicial Independence in Context.indb   205 26/10/2010   3:45:39 PM
206  •  Sonia Lawrence
competitiveness for a judicial position. These data are clear that simply 
waiting for trickle up effects will not produce a bench which is repre-
sentative of the profession, let alone of the public.
a second significant complication when moving from mere diversity 
to reflectiveness is that categorizing and counting (to measure whether 
the goal is met) requires a certain reshaping of complex realities and 
frequently raises thorny questions. Many categorizations or ascriptive 
markers present difficulties because they are particularly fluid or varie-
gated. disability, for instance: many people move into (and out of) the 
category of disabled; the category includes conditions which are visible 
and those which are invisible; the category includes conditions which 
create severe hardship in everyday life, and those where the hardship is 
considerably less significant. Sexual diversity also presents challenges 
when we are trying to describe what a reflective judiciary might look 
like.35 although “there is evident sexual diversity within the judiciary,” 
as well as evident homophobia, empirically measuring that sexual di-
versity requires recognizing the extent to which sexuality is a fluid cat-
egory, and thinking about the complicated ways in which “members of 
the judiciary manage the boundary between invisibility and visibility.”36 
What is the nature of the contribution a closeted gay judge makes to 
judicial diversity?37 The attention that queer theory pays to identity and 
group membership promises to provide new and challenging ideas for 
this area of research.38 even those ascriptive categories that we tend to 
35 See leslie J. Moran, “Judicial diversity and the challenge of Sexuality: Some prelimin-
ary Findings” (2006) 28 Sydney l. rev. 565 at 575 (“. . . merely adding lesbian and gay 
sexualities to the agenda of judicial diversity is problematic.”).
36 Moran, ibid. at 571; see also Todd Brower, “Multistable Figures: Sexual Orientation 
visibility and its effects on the experiences of Sexual Minorities in the courts” bepress 
Legal Series (11 august 2006), online: bepress law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1519 
(Brower discusses clients and court workers, but does not appear to have had judges 
as respondents to his questions).
37 This type of question is certainly not unique to the identity category of sexuality. 
in different forms—perhaps more often than many would think—it applies to other 
identity categories as well.
38 See Moran’s questions about a model which “assumes that the lesbian-and-gay com-
munity can be singled out and differentiated; that it is a relatively coherent, homogen-
ous, social, culturally and spatially distinct and separable entity,” above note 35 at 574. 
Some of Moran’s interview subjects make this point explicitly. Moran also notes the 
ways in which these identity labels can reinforce binaries (e.g., homosexual/hetero-
sexual) that might be better challenged, and may leave unchallenged the privileges ac-
corded to the more privileged side of the divide. See above note 35 at 575–76.
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treat as solid (and i treat as such in other parts of this paper) are much 
less reliable than we might think.
Shifting the discussion from one about diversity and judicial in-
dependence to one about reflectiveness or representation and judicial 
independence is an important discursive move (though certainly not a 
novel one!).39 representativeness is a comparative concept, meaning more 
than just difference. a representative bench aims to mirror the identity 
characteristics of the population it judges.40 calling for a diverse bench 
avoids some of the complications of representativeness but it may also 
avoid attention to underlying issues and encourage “tokenism.” calling 
for representation more squarely confronts the ways in which a homogen-
ous—or otherwise non-representative—bench threatens impartiality, by 
calling attention to the disparity between the judges and the judged.
ironically, part of the reason that representativeness offers a direct 
challenge to the ideal of impartiality is because of the assumption that 
judges who are appointed under a system which aims at representa-
39 du Bois, above note 4 (describing a critical but subtle difference between the two). 
Other authors also refer to representation, for instance see isabel Grant & lynn Smith, 
“Gender representation in the canadian Judiciary” in Ontario law reform commis-
sion, Appointing Judges: philosophy, politics and practice (Toronto: Ontario law reform 
commission, 1991) at 57ff; hale, above note 3 at 502 (“as individuals, my colleagues 
are a remarkably diverse bunch, but i do not need to rehearse the facts about how 
unrepresentative they are . . .”). The Ontario Judicial appointments advisory commit-
tee does as well: “The provincial judiciary should be reasonably representative of the 
population it serves” in Ontario, Judicial appointments advisory committee, Annual 
Report for the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2005 (Toronto: Jaac, 2006) 
at 10; The uK department for constitutional affairs usually chooses to use the word 
diversity (see, for instance, online: dca www.dca.gov.uk/judges/diversity.htm).
40 in certain areas of scholarship, different types of representation are recognized. pol-
itical scientists looking at electoral politics tend to differentiate between descriptive 
representation (where ascriptive characteristics are matched) and substantive rep-
resentation (where issues and views are advanced by the representative). researchers 
looking at bureaucracy have distinguished between active representation (in which 
decision making is guided by a diversity of views and experiences) and passive rep-
resentation (similar to descriptive representation). See Jessica Sowa & Sally coleman 
Selden, “administrative discretion and active representation?: an expansion of the 
Theory of representative Bureaucracy” (2003) 63 public administration review 700; 
Manon Tremblay & réjean pelletier, “More Feminists or More Women? descriptive and 
Substantive representations of Women in the 1997 canadian Federal elections” (2000) 
21 international political Science review 381; richard Ogmundson, “does it Matter if 
Women, Minorities and Gays Govern?: new data concerning an Old Question” (2005) 
30 canadian Journal of Sociology 315.
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tion will actually attempt to “represent” a particular community in their 
judgments—usually the role of the legislature.41 i shall avoid directly 
confronting the enormity of this conflict and offer only two counter-
arguments to this position, both of which see the critique as a misread 
of the demand for reflection/representation. First, the complexities of 
community and identity are such that one cannot easily determine how 
a judge could best craft judgments which would represent the views of 
an identity group (although it may be easier to determine what a judge 
would avoid doing). This, of course, has not prevented judges who be-
long to minority communities from being seen as “representatives” in 
this sense, leaving them vulnerable to claims of bias.42 Second, if the 
argument against representation is correct, its proponents must con-
front the possibility that in a system which appoints only those already 
marked by racial, gender, or ethnic privilege to the bench, appointees 
might easily understand part of their role to be the preservation of that 
privilege.43 as such, the critique deserves attention, but it cannot fore-
stall the argument for reform. One result of these critiques is the conclu-
sion that representation itself is a misleading and provocative term, and 
we would be better off using the metaphor of a mirror which reflects 
the composition of society. This idea could capture both the audience 
members—the public—who look into the mirror and at the same time 
the openly superficial nature of descriptive representation.44
41 These arguments are particularly fraught in the uS context, where many judges are 
elected, and problems with racial under-representation persist due to a variety of 
structural constraints. See generally ifill, above note 11. See Webber, above note 22 at 
23: “any attempt to improve their representativeness would run headlong into alterna-
tive conceptions of their role, the most obvious being that of defenders of individual 
rights against majoritarian control.”
42 There are a number of examples. For a small taste, see: R v. R.D.S., [1997] 3 S.c.r. 484, 
151 d.l.r. (4th) 193. an important case in the american context is Commonwealth of 
pennsylvania v. Local union 542, international union of operating engineers, 388 F. Supp 
155 (e.d. penn, 1974), a race discrimination case against the union, in which Judge a. 
leon higginbotham was asked to recuse himself. at least in part, the union relied on a 
speech the Judge had given to a group of african american historians where the Judge 
used the word “we” in addressing the historians.
43 proponents of this argument are usually careful to argue that it is the shift from pure 
merit to the inclusion of a concern about representation which encourages judges to 
try to act as representatives, while systems constructed around traditional understand-
ings of merit further the sense that judges should be impartial decision makers.
44 descriptive representation is a limited concept, and it is difficult to attack it on the 
grounds that it lacks substance. For studies and explanations of descriptive represen-
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The discursive shift i advocate does not, however, imply a rejection 
of the idea of diversity. diversity can capture some critically important 
aspects of the need for difference on the bench. For instance, as erica 
rackley writes,
properly understood, judicial diversity is not simply about ensuring 
that a strategic assortment of judges (or whoever) of varying ages, sex, 
race, class, culture and so on live “happily ever after”—an evening up 
of the numbers on the bench to ensure a kind of numerical aestheti-
cism. nor is it about securing the resigned acceptance by the status 
quo of the inclusion of difference as a political necessity—albeit with 
the tacit assurance that nothing will really change . . . . rather, divers-
ity requires the usual to be transformed by the remarkable, and the 
extraordinary to become the norm.45
Yet rackley also admits that as a term, “diversity” has often been used in 
ways which have watered down its significance and rendered it short-
hand for a political compromise which agrees to diversity as a way of 
preserving the status quo.46
Moving to either representativeness or reflection instead of di-
versity as a goal creates a new and complicated set of questions. When 
looking at how we might measure the representativeness of our judi-
ciary—the extent to which it embodies structural independence and 
is representative of the public it serves—we must decide how perfect 
a reflection of society is required. This forms the dividing line between 
mere diversity and representativeness. Should the group of visible min-
orities be broken down into various sub-groups in order to provide a 
more accurate measure of whether or not there is “reflection”? What 
about those “in the intersections”? Should the percentage of visible 
minority females in society be reflected in the number of visible min-
ority females on the bench? Or should we count in single categories? 
tation, see claudine Gay, “Spirals of Trust? The effect of descriptive representation on 
the relationship between citizens and their Government” (2002) 46 american Journal 
of political Science 717; Kira Sanbonmatsu, “Gender-related political Knowledge and 
the descriptive representation of Women” (2003) 25 political Behavior 367.
45 erika rackley, “Judicial diversity, the Woman Judge and Fairy Tale endings” (2006) 27 
l.S. 74 at 94.
46 ibid. at 93 (“diversity-light does little more than scratch the surface of the bench, 
allowing the more invidious effects of a homogenous judicial culture and instinctive 
understandings of the judge and judging to continue relatively unscathed.”).
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What about demographic differences? Should the bench in Toronto re-
flect the demographics of the city or the country?
This paper can barely scratch the surface of these questions. But it 
does seem that one would seek the answers to these questions by re-
turning to the reasons why i suggested that the judiciary should be re-
flective: creating structural impartiality in the judiciary, improving public 
confidence, and improving democratic legitimacy. We could also look to 
the experience and efforts of other jurisdictions. With respect to inter-
sectionality, then, since structural impartiality rests on the notion that 
different experiences shape one’s worldview, we should take account of 
those characteristics which produce significant variation in experience.47 
We could also look to the ongoing experience in the uK, for instance, 
which has an extremely detailed categorization table to measure the rep-
resentativeness of its judiciary. The chart below illustrates all of the ap-
plicants for the position of high court judge in the 2005 competition.48
All Applicants Male Female Grand 
TotalBar Sol Qc F/T or 
Other
Total Bar Sol Qc F/T or 
Other
Total
W
hi
te
British 3 1 67 28 99 0 0 10 6 16 115
irish 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Other 0 0 6 0 6 0 0 1 0 1 7
Total 3 1 74 28 106 0 0 11 6 17 123
M
ix
ed
White & Black 
caribbean
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
White & Black 
african
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
White & asian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 3
Total 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 3
47 The concept of intersectionality was initially developed by american critical race 
Scholar Kimberlé crenshaw. See Kimberlé crenshaw, “race, reform and retrenchment: 
Transformation and legitimation in antidiscrimination law” (1988) 101 harv. l. rev. 1331; 
Kimberlé crenshaw, “demarginalizing the intersection of race and Sex: a Black Feminist 
critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, Feminist Theory, and antiracist politics” (1989) 
139 u. chi. legal F. 139; Kimberlé crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: intersectionality, 
identity politics, and violence against Women of color” (1991) 43 Stan. l. rev. 1241. The 
concept is not limited to the intersections of gender and “race,” however.
48 department for constitutional affairs, “Judicial appointments 8th report 2005–2006” 
(March 2007) online: dca www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/ja-arep2006/comp-table1.htm.
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All Applicants Male Female Grand 
TotalBar Sol Qc F/T or 
Other
Total Bar Sol Qc F/T or 
Other
Total
A
si
an
indian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
pakistani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bangladeshi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B
la
ck
Black 
caribbean
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Black african 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
chinese (inc. 
Other)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other ethnic 
Group
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
unknown (inc.  
declined)
0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
Grand Total 3 1 79 28 111 0 0 12 6 18 129
% Total 86 14
Average Age 54.7 Average Years in practice 27.8
Without this more specific detail in the table, it would be difficult to 
come to any conclusions about reflectiveness or representation. proving 
the presence of diversity, on the other hand, might require much less.
it is impossible to deny that creating a more representative bench 
through descriptive representation is a terribly limited solution to the 
problem of structural partiality. particularly intriguing is the extent to 
which the norms of judging can assimilate difference. These pressures 
may be all the greater for women, members of minorities, and the dis-
abled (since these judges may be more likely to be criticized for any de-
cisions which can be seen to favour their own identity group(s)).49 What 
do they have to live up to? The chief Justice of canada was remarkably 
candid on this subject:
We all possess a certain image of a judge. he is old, male, and wears 
pinstriped trousers . . . . he is respected and revered. his word is, lit-
erally and figuratively, the law, eternal, majestic. even those of us who 
49 See above note 42 on same point.
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do not fit naturally into the traditional image tend to grow into it. The 
truth cannot be avoided. We judges like the old image. We cling to it. 
and why not? it brings comfort, the comfort of knowing one is right, 
at least pending the verdict of a higher court, although most of us 
learned to rationalize that as well. it brings security, the security of 
knowing what to do and when to do it. and it brings gratification, the 
gratification of knowing we are important and appreciated.50
in almost poignant terms, the chief Justice hints at the kinds of 
stresses facing all judges, but particularly judges who are not in “the 
traditional image.” as Baronness hale asks, “. . . how difficult it is . . . to 
forge a new picture of a judge who does not fit the traditional model 
but is still recognizably a judge.”51 They may shift their opinions and ac-
tivities to match that image. in doing so, they may eliminate some—or 
all—of the difference that they brought to the bench. Justice harry la-
Forme’s (tongue in cheek?) description of himself as “a red man dispens-
ing white man’s justice” makes poetry of the deep ambiguity involved in 
this diversity/representation project, however we want to describe it.52 
These judges push us to wonder not only whether it can be done “with 
difference,” but whether “it” is something we want done at all.
a second caveat, despite my arguments that identity factors shape 
experiences and beliefs and that therefore we can hypothesize simi-
larities within identity groups, is that the convergence should not be 
overstated. The subtleties of discrimination and individual response en-
sure that there will be differences of more or less significance within 
identity groups as well as between identity groups. categorizing all ra-
cial minorities into one group may obscure the fact that discriminatory 
patterns and practices are often quite specifically directed against par-
50 right honourable Beverley Mclachlin p.c., “The role of Judges in Modern Society” 
(The Fourth Worldwide common law Judiciary conference, vancouver, 5 May 2001), 
online: www.scc-csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/judges/speeches/role-of-judges_e.asp. See also 
hale, above note 3 at 497 (arguing that many women continue to wear the traditional 
wig because “[i]n making [women barristers and judges] look more like a man [a wig] 
adds the appearance of weight, seriousness and selflessness to what they do”); erika 
rackley, “representations of the (Woman) Judge: hercules, the little Mermaid, and the 
vain and naked emperor” (2002) 22 l.S. 602.
51 hale, above note 3 at 498.
52 Quoted in harry laForme, “You Be The Judge” The York university Magazine for Alumni 
and friends (august 2000), online: York university www.yorku.ca/ycom/profiles/past/
aug00/current/dept/gprofile/gprofile2.htm.
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ticular groups. it may also obscure the particulars of intersectionality. 
Membership in a crudely categorized identity group gives only a lim-
ited indication of experiences and a limited indication of the beliefs and 
ideologies formed in response to those experiences. Since judges are 
educationally and occupationally elite, even the experiences of judges 
from “non-traditional backgrounds” might not always be substantially 
different to those of their (white, male) colleagues. My discussion has 
accepted some of the limits of the current system—but if we do not? it 
is a significant challenge to the imagination to speculate about the pos-
sible contributions of judges without elite educational status.
a final caveat relates to the discussion of public confidence, par-
ticularly the confidence that minority communities place in the justice 
system:
[T]he symbols and substance of justice in this country create such a 
huge gap in terms of appreciation of vulnerability, that increased fe-
male, native or minority representation in the canadian judiciary will 
never be sufficient by itself.53
The identity of judges is only part (and perhaps a small part) of 
the development of public confidence in the justice system. although 
there is no wall which separates the judge from the law—judges make 
the law as they apply it—the substance of the law and the operation 
of law in society are obviously of prime significance in terms of public 
confidence. Still, what evidence we have suggests that we are far from 
even the illusion of sufficiency in terms of female, native or minority 
representation, and there is little reason to assume that we will get there 
any time soon.
C. ThROUGh A GLASS . . . : OPERATIONALIzING 
APPOINTMENTS
Turning to the systems we use to appoint judges, it is difficult to gather 
basic information about both the pool of applicants and the successful 
candidates in canada. The national association for Women and the law 
(naWl) reported some years ago that almost all we do know is that there 
53 Mendes, above note 24 at 94.
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is under-representation.54 There is little evidence of substantial improve-
ment on that front. On issues such as race and ethnicity, much of the 
available information appears to be based on personal knowledge and 
anecdote, so it appears in fragmented form without documentation.55
in this final section of the paper, i take a brief look at judicial ap-
pointments in canada, in order to explore the way that the question of 
diversity and representation on the bench has been dealt with on the 
ground. For the purpose of this brief discussion, i looked at only the On-
54 national association of Women and the law, above note 5 at 13: “Since human rights 
legislation does not allow questions, success is difficult to measure.” current federal 
and Ontario legislation does not bar data collection under appropriate circumstances 
and in fact encourages organizations to collect and analyze data about the diversity 
of their workforce. See Ontario human rights commission, “policy and Guidelines on 
racism and racial discrimination: part iii—Guidelines for implementation: Monitor-
ing and combating racism and racial discrimination,” online: Ontario human rights 
commission www.ohrc.on.ca/en/resources/policies/racismpolicy?page=racismpolicy-
parT-3.html#heading653. See also employment equity Act, S.c. 1995, c. 44 (requiring 
employers who fall under the act to collect data on four under-represented groups).
55 This kind of information suggests that less than twenty judges in canada are black, 
and about twenty are aboriginal: “Bench Still lacking ethnic diversity” Law Times (2 
March 2008), online: law Times www.lawtimesnews.com/index.php?option=com_co
ntent&task=view&id=1347&itemid=82. Speaking at a conference organized by and for 
black law students, Judge daniel dortelus of the court of Quebec said that “less than 
20 [of canada’s 2000 judges] are Black and the majority . . . are in Ontario.” a variety of 
claims can be found, but there are few definitive sources of information (one excep-
tion is the annual reports of the Ontario Judicial appointments advisory committee, 
which provide data on provincially appointed judges in Ontario who were appointed 
since 1989). See for instance, Ontario Bar association, “Federal Judicial appointment 
process” (October 2005), online: OBa www.cba.org/cBa/Submissions/pdf/05-43-
eng.pdf at 9 (“fewer than two dozen” canadian judges are aboriginal); law Society 
of upper canada, “national aboriginal day 2007: The role of aboriginal Judges: a 
Balance of perspectives” (25 June 2007), online: lSuc www.lsuc.on.ca/latest-news/b/
archives/?i=12260 (“Justice ducharme pointed out that there are only five [aboriginal] 
federally appointed judges in canada, four in Ontario and one in Manitoba.”). See also 
the claim that there are eighteen aboriginal judges in canada: “Justice Sinclair to 
speak on ‘aboriginal legal issues the courts are Going to have to decide Someday,’” 
online: university of Windsor www.uwindsor.ca/units/law/newschannel/news.nsf/in
Toc/1d1B77e7734963608525727B006511e7?Opendocument; another article asserts 
that there are twenty provincial court judges of aboriginal descent in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan: See “native point of view needed in Top court, experts argue” Capital 
news online (18 March 2005), online: carleton university www.carleton.ca/jmc/
cnews/18032005/n2.shtml. i offer these cites not to try to answer the question of how 
many aboriginal judges are sitting, but rather to point out that there is some appetite 
for this information but the government and judicial system do not, by and large, pro-
vide it.
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tario and federal systems of judicial appointment. despite a similar basic 
framework (in which arms-length judicial appointments committees are 
used) the systems differ markedly in terms of the attention they appear 
to be giving to questions of diversity, representativeness, and in terms 
of transparency of process.
in Ontario, the Ontario Judicial appointments advisory committee 
(OJaac) was established in 1989 to improve the appointment system of 
provincial court judges. its mandate was two-fold: (1) to develop sound 
criteria for selecting judicial appointees, and (2) to interview appoin-
tees and make recommendations to the aG.56 Since 1989, 240 judges 
have been appointed based on the committee’s recommendations.57 
The committee’s advertisements for judicial vacancies state that the 
judiciary “should reasonably reflect the diversity of the population it 
serves,”58 and it is required under the courts of Justice act to issue an 
annual report on its activities.59 The annual reports set out the criteria 
used in making appointments: (1) professional excellence; (2) commun-
ity awareness; (3) personal characteristics, such as patience and high 
ethics; and (4) demographics having regard to reasonable representa-
tion of the population.60
The 240 appointments made in Ontario from 1989 to 2005 are de-
scribed in the table below. These statistics show that the different iden-
tified under-represented groups are achieving quite different levels of 
success. at the same time, this set of statistics addresses neither con-
cerns about intersectionality amongst categories, nor the frequently 
made observation that differences amongst visible minority/racialized 
groups are analytically important. Questions like, are more judges being 
appointed from some racialized communities than others, or are judges 
from racialized groups more or less likely than white judges to be male, 
cannot be answered.
56 Judicial appointments advisory committee, Annual Report for the period from 1 January 
2005 to 31 December 2005 (Toronto: Jaac, 2006) at ix.
57 ibid. at vii. One issue that remains unclear is whether or under what circumstances an 
attorney General can depart from the recommendations of the Judicial appointments 
advisory committee.
58 ibid. at 4.
59 Courts of Justice Act, r.S.O. 1990, c. c.43, s. 43(13).
60 above note 56 at 10. a significant issue here is language, specifically, proficiency in 
French.
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Group Percentage of 
appointments61
Percentage 
in the 
Ontario legal 
profession62
Percentage in 
the Canadian 
population63
Percentage in 
the Ontario 
population64
Women 33.8% 35.1% 49.5% 50.7%
First nations 2.0% 0.6% 2.2% 1.3%
visible Minority 6.7% 9.2% 16.2% 22.8%
persons with 
disabilities
0% not available 12.4%65 13.5%66
Ontario’s process is relatively open and involves a significant 
amount of data collection and reporting. The situation at the federal 
level, where one of the goals is “ensuring the development and mainten-
ance of a judiciary that is representative of the diversity of canadian 
society,” and the “committees are encouraged to respect diversity and to 
give due consideration to all legal experience, including that outside a 
mainstream legal practice” is quite different.67 The application materials 
contain few other references to diversity. There is a page in the personal 
history Form which states: “OpTiOnal Given the goal of ensuring the 
development and maintenance of a judiciary that is representative of 
the diversity of canadian society, you may, if you choose, provide infor-
mation about yourself that you feel would assist in this objective. There 
is no obligation to do so.”68 There does not appear to be any information 
which would allow a measure of accountability around diversity goals 
and procedures. The Office of the commissioner for Federal Judicial 
affairs provides information about numbers of male and female sitting 
61 ibid. at 2–3
62 Michael Ornstein, “a report to the law Society of upper canada: The changing Face 
of the Ontario legal profession, 1971–2001”, online: The law Society of upper canada 
rc.lsuc.on.ca/jsp/equity/policies-publications-reports.jsp at 2–3.
63 Statistics canada, 2001 Census Data products, online: Statistics canada www12.statcan.
ca/english/census01/products/standard/themes/dataproducts.cfm?S=1.
64 ibid.
65 Statistics canada, participation and Activity Limitation Survey, 2001, online: Statistics 
canada www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/89-577-Xie/canada.htm.
66 ibid.
67 Office of the commission for Federal Judicial affairs, process for an Application for Ap-
pointment, online: OcFJa www.fja.gc.ca/fja-cmf/ja-am/process-regime-eng.html.
68 Office of the commission for Federal Judicial affairs, federal Judicial Appointments 
personal History form, online: OcFJa www.fja.gc.ca/fja-cmf/ja-am/pf-fc/files-fiches/
phf-fc-judge-juge-eng.pdf.
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judges.69 no information about race/ethnicity, aboriginality, or disabil-
ity is available, and an unsuccessful Freedom of information request sug-
gests that this information is not collected in aggregate form at all.70 
There is no publicly available information about the applicant pool.
The differences between the operational details of these systems 
need some investigation. reasons for the dearth of information from the 
federal system can be imagined, but not analysed without more infor-
mation (is there a federal lack of interest, concern about difficulties in 
creating appropriate measurement instruments, desire to conceal the 
situation or just avoid the issue, unease about collecting such informa-
tion, or concern about provoking opponents of efforts to appoint a judi-
ciary which reflects the diversity of the population?).
Some jurisdictions offer significant information about the compos-
ition of the judiciary. Most notably, the department of constitutional 
affairs in the uK collects information about ethnic origin, gender, dis-
ability status, and professional background for every level of the judi-
69 These statistics describe only those judges appointed in a particular year:
Year Male judges female Judges Total
2005 30 21 (41%) 51
2006 31 16 (34%) 47
2007 42 18 (30%) 60
2008 (to 2008/04/29) 15 8 (35%) 23
Office of the commissioner for Federal Judicial affairs, “number of Federal Judges on the 
Bench as of august 1st 2008,” online: OFcJa www.fja.gc.ca/fja-cmf/ja-am/n-judges-juges-
eng.html gives the current statistics on the number of women in federally appointed 
positions.
70 The OcFJa is not covered by federal freedom of information legislation (Access to infor-
mation Act, r.S.c., 1985, c. a-1). after being verbally advised by the OcFJa that such in-
formation is not available in aggregate form, i filed a request for “information about the 
pool of applicants considered for appointment to the Superior courts, Federal court, 
Federal court of appeal, and Tax court of canada, and/or those actually appointed to 
same. Specifically: aggregate numbers or percentages of applicants/appointees who are 
members of under-represented groups (First nations, visible Minorities, persons with 
disabilities). For years after 2000 or most recent year available” with the department 
of Justice. not surprisingly, i received a letter on 21 May 2008 informing me that “a 
search of the records under the control of the department of Justice has revealed none 
on this subject.” The letter refers me to the website of the OcFJa for information on 
the number of women judges. The letter is on file with the author. Without engaging 
the significant public and academic debate over the keeping of statistics based on 
“race,” i will point out that this context is arguably far less complicated than the ques-
tion of “race”/crime statistical records.
Judicial Independence in Context.indb   217 26/10/2010   3:45:41 PM
218  •  Sonia Lawrence
ciary, from the entire applicant pool, successful applicants, and sitting 
judges. These statistics are quite detailed in their categorization, and 
allow for comparisons between the British general population and the 
judiciary to be made with ease and for the different success rates in ap-
pointing members of different minority groups to be clearly measured. 
if representativeness—or even diversity simpliciter—is the goal, there 
can be no accountability without these numbers.71
D.  CONCLUSION
This brief exploration of judicial independence and judicial diversity 
does offer some clear directions for further canadian research. We need 
answers to some basic questions in terms of judicial independence, ju-
dicial appointments, diversity, and representation. Most importantly, it 
seems, we lack empirical data on the current makeup of the judiciary. 
We also lack data on key questions in terms of public confidence in 
the judiciary, and how public opinion does or does not differ between 
different population subsets. comparative research on strategies used 
across the country in recruiting judges, and with respect to different 
under-represented groups would also be useful. Why have we been so 
successful, comparatively, in increasing the representation of women on 
the bench, but less so with respect to visible minorities? developments 
in the uK ought to be followed with close attention, as that country 
embarks on an ambitious effort to improve representation on the bench. 
Finally, the results of this research could be used to develop answers to 
the immensely complicated question of how to assess “reflectiveness”—
at what level of precision and with attention to which identity charac-
teristics? Without more basic data, advocates for a bench that lives up 
to the government’s stated goals (one that would “reflect the diversity of 
the population it serves”) are reduced to reacting to particularly charged 
appointments and egregious instances of judicial ignorance.
71 For instance, the federal employment equity Act, S.c. 1995, c. 44, s.9, requires employers 
to keep records in order to identify and rectify under-representation:
(1) For the purpose of implementing employment equity, every employer shall:
(a) collect information and conduct an analysis of the employer’s workforce, in ac-
cordance with the regulations, in order to determine the degree of the under-
representation of persons in designated groups in each occupational group in 
that workforce.
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Of course a more representative bench is a goal that is both very 
ambitious and not ambitious enough. it is very ambitious because it 
will require more than just changes to appointment processes—it will 
require that the opportunities to become candidates are opened up as 
well. The long path to a judgeship means many “entry points” need to be 
similarly ready to become more open to a representative societal group. 
Yet at the same time, the goal is not ambitious enough because it will 
not cure the injustices that we currently create within our system of 
justice. For instance, judicial education will continue to be critical in 
alerting judges to the experiences of the population they are asked to 
judge.72 improving appointments is far from the only thing we need to do 
to foster a truly inclusive society.
72 On judicial education’s role in this process, see elizabeth handsley, “‘The Judicial 
Whisper Goes around’: appointment of Judicial Officers in australia” in russell & 
Malleson, above note 4 at 130. See also the thoughtful contribution of rosemary cairns 
Way in this volume. 
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